Let's jointly consider Social Security.

All our money has been spent.

Someone has already made an answer. Can paste it now.

Copy the link in the comment.

Article 1. Disagree. Because

1. Reduce the participation and actual representation of insurers throughout the system

2. May cause a monopoly or a large group to occupy all seats

Article 2. Disagree. Because

1. Dividing the number of representatives according to the proportion of each section of the insurer, causing the board to become a "group representative" instead of a system-wide insurer. As a result, the decision on the board may be divided between sections.

2. Reduce cross-group participation, such as M.33 insurers, unable to vote in support of candidates from M.40 who offer good policies at all, resulting in a lack of cognitive diversity and not reflecting the actual needs of most fund users.

Article 3.1 does not agree. Because

1. Define vague properties and open channels to interpretation / discrimination by high discretion.

2. Reduce the participation and diversity of representatives from real insurers

3. It may be a "falling" tool or limit elections to easy-to-control groups.

4. Not necessary. Because voters are the best "inspectors."

Article 3.2 does not agree. Because

1. Define vague properties and open up channels for interpretation. It is not practical to measure.

2. It may be a "falling" tool or limit elections to easy-to-control groups.

3. Not necessary. Because voters are the best "inspectors."

Article 3.3 does not agree. Because

1. Discourage applicants from the group of most real insurers who work regularly (M.33).

2. The designation of a "Superior Permission Book" for government employees / government employees is a restriction of rights beyond the cause and may interfere with the principle of impartiality.

3. No need because the Social Security Board is not a full-time position like a civil servant.

Article 3.4 does not agree. Because

1. Define vague properties and open channels to interpretation / discrimination by high discretion.

2. Deprive candidates from labour movement groups and civil society who have previously been politically involved.

3. Not necessary and may be a competitive limiting tool

Article 3.5 does not agree. Because

1. Discourage candidates with useful knowledge, competence and experience on the board.

2. It is not necessary because there is already a conflict of interest and conflict of interest protection mechanism.

Article 3.6 does not agree. Because

1. Scrub the principles of direct elections and real representation

2. Open channels for intervention and politics within the high board.

Clause 4 disagrees. Because

1. Set the threshold too high and discourage candidates from the M.40 group.

2. Excessively higher than the Master Law and previous elections (2023)

3. Open up a high level of interpretation and discretion, especially on "intentionally unpaid."

4. It does not improve board quality, but reduces competition and diversity.

Article 5 disagrees. Because

1. Define subjective observer properties and open the discretionary channel too high.

2. The observation system is designed to be "may or may not be organized and controlled by the State Committee.

3. Open the box to "stop observation" easily, using "accusation" as a reason.

The suggestion can be * Use the original 2023 Covenant, or if anyone has other good suggestions, it can also be suggested.